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Abstract
This research work presents a new class of non-blind information hid-
ing algorithms that are stego-secure and robust. They are based on some
finite domains iterations having the Devaney’s topological chaos prop-
erty. Thanks to a complete formalization of the approach we prove se-
curity against watermark-only attacks of a large class of steganographic
algorithms. Finally a complete study of robustness is given in frequency
DWT and DCT domains.
1 Introduction
This work focus on non-blind binary information hiding chaotic schemes: the
original host is required to extract the binary hidden information. This context
is indeed not as restrictive as it could primarily appear. Firstly, it allows to
prove the authenticity of a document sent through the Internet (the original
document is stored whereas the stego content is sent). Secondly, Alice and
Bob can establish an hidden channel into a streaming video (Alice and Bob
both have the same movie, and Alice hide information into the frame number
k iff the binary digit number k of its hidden message is 1). Thirdly, based
on a similar idea, a same given image can be marked several times by using
various secret parameters owned both by Alice and Bob. Thus more than one
bit can be embedded into a given image by using this work. Lastly, non-blind
watermarking is useful in network’s anonymity and intrusion detection [1], and
to protect digital data sending through the Internet [2]. Furthermore, enlarging
the given payload of a data hiding scheme leads clearly to a degradation of its
security: the smallest the number of embedded bits is, the better the security
is.
Chaos-based approaches are frequently proposed to improve the quality of
schemes in information hiding [3, 4, 5, 6]. In these works, the understanding
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of chaotic systems is almost intuitive: a kind of noise-like spread system with
sensitive dependence on initial condition. Practically, some well-known chaotic
maps are used either in the data encryption stage [4, 5], in the embedding into
the carrier medium, or in both [3, 7]. Methods referenced above are almost
based on two fundamental chaotic maps, namely the Chebychev and logistic
maps, which range in R. To avoid justifying that functions which are chaotic in
R still remain chaotic in the computing representation (i.e., floating numbers)
we argue that functions should be iterated on finite domains. Boolean discrete-
time dynamical systems (BS) are thus iterated.
Furthermore, previously referenced works often focus on discretion and/or
robustness properties, but they do not consider security. As far as we know,
stego-security [8] and chaos-security have only been proven on the spread spec-
trum watermarking [9], and on the dhCI algorithm [10], which is notably based
on iterating the negation function. We argue that other functions can provide
algorithms as secure as the dhCI one. This work generalizes thus this latter
algorithm and formalizes all its stages. Due to this formalization, we address
the proofs of the two security properties for a large class of steganography ap-
proaches.
This research work is organized as follows. It firstly introduces the new
class of algorithms (Sec. 2), which is the first contribution. Next, the Section 3
presents a State-of-the-art in information hiding security and shows how secure
is our approach. The proof is the second contribution. The chaos-security
property is studied in Sec. 4 and instances of algorithms guaranteeing that
desired property are presented. This is the fourth contribution. Applications
in frequency domains (namely DWT and DCT embedding) are formalized and
corresponding experiments are given in Sec. 5. This shows the applicability of
the whole approach. Finally, conclusive remarks and perspectives are given in
Sec. 6.
2 Information hiding algorithm: formalization
As far as we know, no result rules that the chaotic behavior of a function that
has been established on R remains on the floating numbers. As stated before,
this work presents the alternative to iterate a Boolean map: results that are
theoretically obtained in that domain are preserved during implementations.
In this section, we first give some recalls on Boolean discrete dynamical Sys-
tems (BS). With this material, next sections formalize the information hiding
algorithms based on these Boolean iterations.
2.1 Boolean discrete dynamical systems
Let us denote by Ja; bK the interval of integers: {a, a+ 1, . . . , b}, where a 6 b.
Let n be a positive integer. A Boolean discrete-time network is a discrete
dynamical system defined from a Boolean map f : Bn → Bn s.t.
x = (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ f(x) = (f1(x), . . . , fn(x)),
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and an iteration scheme: parallel, serial, asynchronous. . .With the parallel iter-
ation scheme, the dynamics of the system are described by xt+1 = f(xt) where
x0 ∈ Bn. Let thus Ff : J1;nK×B
n to Bn be defined by
Ff (i, x) = (x1, . . . , xi−1, fi(x), xi+1, . . . , xn),
with the asynchronous scheme, the dynamics of the system are described by
xt+1 = Ff (s
t, xt) where x0 ∈ Bn and s is a strategy, i.e., a sequence in J1;nKN.
Notice that this scheme only modifies one element at each iteration.
Let Gf be the map from X = J1;nK
N ×Bn to itself s.t.
Gf (s, x) = (σ(s), Ff (s
0, x)),
where σ(s)t = st+1 for all t in N. Notice that parallel iteration of Gf from an
initial point X0 = (s, x0) describes the “same dynamics” as the asynchronous
iteration of f induced by the initial point x0 and the strategy s.
Finally, let f be a map from Bn to itself. The asynchronous iteration graph
associated with f is the directed graph Γ(f) defined by: the set of vertices is
B
n; for all x ∈ Bn and i ∈ J1;nK, Γ(f) contains an arc from x to Ff (i, x).
We have already established [11] that we can define a distance d on X such
that Gf is a continuous and chaotic function according to Devaney [12]. The
next section focus on the coding step of the steganographic algorithm based on
Gf iterations.
2.2 Coding
In what follows, y always stands for a digital content we wish to hide into a
digital host x.
The data hiding scheme presented here does not constrain media to have a
constant size. It is indeed sufficient to provide a function and a strategy that
may be parametrized with the size of the elements to modify. The mode and
the strategy-adapter defined below achieve this goal.
Definition 1 (Mode) A map f , which associates to any n ∈ N an application
fn : B
n → Bn, is called a mode.
For instance, the negation mode is defined by the map that assigns to every
integer n ∈ N∗ the function
¬n : B
n → Bn, (x1, . . . , xn) 7→ (x1, . . . , xn).
Definition 2 (Strategy-Adapter) A strategy-adapter is a function S from N
to the set of integer sequences, which associates to n a sequence S ∈ J1, nKN.
Intuitively, a strategy-adapter aims at generating a strategy (St)t∈N where
each term St belongs to J1, nK. Moreover it may be parametrized in order to
depend on digital media to embed.
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For instance, let us define the Chaotic Iterations with Independent Strategy
(CIIS ) strategy-adapter. The CIIS strategy-adapter with parameters (K, y, α, l) ∈
[0, 1]×[0, 1]×]0, 0.5[×N is the function that associates to any n ∈ N the sequence
(St)t∈N defined by:
• K0 = bin(y)⊕bin(K): K0 is the real number whose binary decomposition
is equal to the bitwise exclusive or (xor) between the binary decomposi-
tions of y and of K;
• ∀t 6 l,Kt+1 = F (Kt, α);
• ∀t 6 l, St = ⌊n×Kt⌋+ 1;
• ∀t > l, St = 0.
where F is the piecewise linear chaotic map [13], recalled in what follows:
Definition 3 (Piecewise linear chaotic map) Let α ∈]0; 0.5[ be a control
parameter. The piecewise linear chaotic map is the map F defined by:
F (t, α) =


t
α
t ∈ [0;α],
t− α
1
2 − α
t ∈ [α; 12 ],
F (1− t, α) t ∈ [ 12 ; 1].
Contrary to the logistic map, the use of this piecewise linear chaotic map is
relevant in cryptographic usages [14].
Parameters of CIIS strategy-adapter will be instantiate as follows: K is the
secret embedding key, y is the secret message, α is the threshold of the piecewise
linear chaotic map, which can be set as K or can act as a second secret key.
Lastly, l is for the iteration number bound: enlarging its value improve the
chaotic behavior of the scheme, but the time required to achieve the embedding
grows too.
Another strategy-adapter is the Chaotic Iterations with Dependent Strategy
(CIDS) with parameters (l, X) ∈ N×BN, which is the function that maps any
n ∈ N to the sequence (St)
t∈N
defined by:
• ∀t 6 l, if t 6 l and Xt = 1, then St = t, else St = 1;
• ∀t > l, St = 0.
Let us notice that the terms of x that may be replaced by terms taken from
y are less important than other: they could be changed without be perceived
as such. More generally, a signification function attaches a weight to each term
defining a digital media, w.r.t. its position t:
Definition 4 (Signification function) A signification function is a real se-
quence (uk)k∈N.
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For instance, let us consider a set of grayscale images stored into portable
graymap format (P3-PGM): each pixel ranges between 256 gray levels, i.e., is
memorized with eight bits. In that context, we consider uk = 8− (k mod 8) to
be the k-th term of a signification function (uk)k∈N. Intuitively, in each group
of eight bits (i.e., for each pixel) the first bit has an importance equal to 8,
whereas the last bit has an importance equal to 1. This is compliant with the
idea that changing the first bit affects more the image than changing the last
one.
Definition 5 (Significance of coefficients) Let (uk)k∈N be a signification
function, m and M be two reals s.t. m < M . Then the most significant
coefficients (MSCs) of x is the finite vector uM , the least significant coefficients
(LSCs) of x is the finite vector um, and the passive coefficients of x is the finite
vector up such that:
uM =
(
k
∣∣ k ∈ N and uk > M and k ≤| x |)
um =
(
k
∣∣ k ∈ N and uk ≤ m and k ≤| x |)
up =
(
k
∣∣ k ∈ N and uk ∈]m;M [ and k ≤| x |)
For a given host content x, MSCs are then ranks of x that describe the
relevant part of the image, whereas LSCs translate its less significant parts.
We are then ready to decompose an host x into its coefficients and then to
recompose it. Next definitions formalize these two steps.
Definition 6 (Decomposition function) Let (uk)k∈N be a signification func-
tion, B the set of finite binary sequences, N the set of finite integer sequences,
m and M be two reals s.t. m < M . Any host x can be decomposed into
(uM , um, up, φM , φm, φp) ∈ N×N×N×B×B×B
where
• uM , um, and up are coefficients defined in Definition 5;
• φM =
(
xu
1
M , xu
2
M , . . . , xu
|uM |
M
)
;
• φm =
(
xu
1
m , xu
2
m , . . . , xu
|um|
m
)
;
• φp =
(
xu
1
p , xu
2
p , . . . , xu
|up|
p
)
.
The function that associates the decomposed host to any digital host is the de-
composition function. It is further referred as dec(u,m,M) since it is parametrized
by u, m, and M . Notice that u is a shortcut for (uk)k∈N.
Definition 7 (Recomposition) Let (uM , um, up, φM , φm, φp) ∈ N×N×N×
B×B×B s.t.
5
• the sets of elements in uM , elements in um, and elements in up are a
partition of J1, nK;
• |uM | = |ϕM |, |um| = |ϕm|, and |up| = |ϕp|.
One can associate the vector
x =
|uM |∑
i=1
ϕiM .euiM +
|um|∑
i=1
ϕim.euim +
|up|∑
i=1
ϕip.euip
where (ei)i∈N is the usual basis of the R−vectorial space
(
R
N,+, .
)
(that is to
say, eji = δij , where δij is the Kronecker symbol). The function that associates
x to any (uM , um, up, φM , φm, φp) following the above constraints is called the
recomposition function.
The embedding consists in the replacement of the values of φm of x’s LSCs
by y. It then composes the two decomposition and recomposition functions seen
previously. More formally:
Definition 8 (Embedding media) Let dec(u,m,M) be a decomposition func-
tion, x be a host content, (uM , um, up, φM , φm, φp) be its image by dec(u,m,M),
and y be a digital media of size |um|. The digital media z resulting on the em-
bedding of y into x is the image of (uM , um, up, φM , y, φp) by the recomposition
function rec.
Let us then define the dhCI information hiding scheme presented in [10]:
Definition 9 (Data hiding dhCI) Let dec(u,m,M) be a decomposition func-
tion, f be a mode, S be a strategy adapter, x be an host content,
(uM , um, up, φM , φm, φp) be its image by dec(u,m,M), q be a positive natu-
ral number, and y be a digital media of size l = |um|.
The dhCI dissimulation maps any (x, y) to the digital media z resulting on
the embedding of yˆ into x, s.t.
• we instantiate the mode f with parameter l = |um|, leading to the function
fl : B
l → Bl;
• we instantiate the strategy adapter S with parameter y (and possibly some
other ones); this instantiation leads to the strategy Sy ∈ J1; lK
N.
• we iterate Gfl with initial configuration (Sy, φm);
• yˆ is finally the q-th term of these iterations.
To summarize, iterations are realized on the LSCs of the host content (the
mode gives the iterate function, the strategy-adapter gives its strategy), and
the last computed configuration is re-injected into the host content, in place of
the former LSCs.
6
Notice that in order to preserve the unpredictable behavior of the system,
the size of the digital medias is not fixed. This approach is thus self adapted to
any media, and more particularly to any size of LSCs. However this flexibility
enlarges the complexity of the presentation: we had to give Definitions 1 and 2
respectively of mode and strategy adapter.
Figure 1: The dhCI dissimulation scheme
Next section shows how to check whether a media contains a watermark.
2.3 Decoding
Let us firstly show how to formally check whether a given digital media z results
from the dissimulation of y into the digital media x.
Definition 10 (Watermarked content) Let dec(u,m,M) be a decomposi-
tion function, f be a mode, S be a strategy adapter, q be a positive natural
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number, y be a digital media, and (uM , um, up, φM , φm, φp) be the image by
dec(u,m,M) of a digital media x. Then z is watermarked with y if the image
by dec(u,m,M) of z is (uM , um, up, φM , yˆ, φp), where yˆ is the right member of
G
q
fl
(Sy, φm).
Various decision strategies are obviously possible to determine whether a
given image z is watermarked or not, depending on the eventuality that the
considered image may have been attacked. For example, a similarity percentage
between x and z can be computed and compared to a given threshold. Other
possibilities are the use of ROC curves or the definition of a null hypothesis
problem.
The next section recalls some security properties and shows how the dhCI
dissimulation algorithm verifies them.
3 Security analysis
3.1 State-of-the-art in information hiding security
As far as we know, Cachin [15] produces the first fundamental work in informa-
tion hiding security: in the context of steganography, the attempt of an attacker
to distinguish between an innocent image and a stego-content is viewed as an
hypothesis testing problem. Mittelholzer [16] next proposed the first theoretical
framework for analyzing the security of a watermarking scheme. Clarification
between robustness and security and classifications of watermarking attacks
have been firstly presented by Kalker [17]. This work has been deepened by
Furon et al. [18], who have translated Kerckhoffs’ principle (Alice and Bob shall
only rely on some previously shared secret for privacy), from cryptography to
data hiding.
More recently [19, 20] classified the information hiding attacks into cate-
gories, according to the type of information the attacker (Eve) has access to:
• in Watermarked Only Attack (WOA) she only knows embedded contents
z;
• in Known Message Attack (KMA) she knows pairs (z, y) of embedded
contents and corresponding messages;
• in Known Original Attack (KOA) she knows several pairs (z, x) of embed-
ded contents and their corresponding original versions;
• in Constant-Message Attack (CMA) she observes several embedded con-
tents z1,. . . ,zk and only knows that the unknown hidden message y is the
same in all contents.
To the best of our knowledge, KMA, KOA, and CMA have not already been
studied due to the lack of theoretical framework. In the opposite, security of
data hiding against WOA can be evaluated, by using a probabilistic approach
recalled below.
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3.2 Stego-security
In the Simmons’ prisoner problem [21], Alice and Bob are in jail and they want
to, possibly, devise an escape plan by exchanging hidden messages in innocent-
looking cover contents. These messages are to be conveyed to one another by
a common warden named Eve, who eavesdrops all contents and can choose to
interrupt the communication if they appear to be stego-contents.
Stego-security, defined in this well-known context, is the highest security
class in Watermark-Only Attack setup, which occurs when Eve has only access
to several marked contents [8].
Let K be the set of embedding keys, p(X) the probabilistic model of N0
initial host contents, and p(Y |K) the probabilistic model of N0 marked contents
s.t. each host content has been marked with the same key K and the same
embedding function.
Definition 11 (Stego-Security [8]) The embedding function is stego-secure
if ∀K ∈ K, p(Y |K) = p(X) is established.
Stego-security states that the knowledge of K does not help to make the dif-
ference between p(X) and p(Y ). This definition implies the following property:
p(Y |K1) = · · · = p(Y |KNk) = p(Y ) = p(X)
This property is equivalent to a zero Kullback-Leibler divergence, which is the
accepted definition of the ”perfect secrecy” in steganography [15].
3.3 The negation mode is stego-secure
To make this article self-contained, this section recalls theorems and proofs of
stego-security for negation mode published in [10].
Proposition 1 dhCI dissimulation of Definition 9 with negation mode and
CIIS strategy-adapter is stego-secure, whereas it is not the case when using CIDS
strategy-adapter.
Proof On the one hand, let us suppose that X ∼ U (Bn) when using
CIIS(K, , , l). We prove by a mathematical induction that ∀t ∈ N, Xt ∼
U (Bn).
The base case is immediate, as X0 = X ∼ U (Bn). Let us now suppose
that the statement Xt ∼ U (Bn) holds until for some t. Let e ∈ Bn and
Bk = (0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ B
n (the digit 1 is in position k).
So P
(
Xt+1 = e
)
=
∑n
k=1 P (X
t = e⊕Bk, S
t = k) where ⊕ is again the bit-
wise exclusive or. These two events are independent when using CIIS strategy-
adapter (contrary to CIDS, CIIS is not built by using X), thus:
P
(
Xt+1 = e
)
=
n∑
k=1
P
(
Xt = e⊕Bk
)
× P
(
St = k
)
.
9
According to the inductive hypothesis: P
(
Xn+1 = e
)
= 12n
∑n
k=1 P (S
t = k).
The set of events {St = k} for k ∈ J1;nK is a partition of the universe of pos-
sible, so
∑n
k=1 P (S
t = k) = 1. Finally, P
(
Xt+1 = e
)
= 12n , which leads to
Xt+1 ∼ U (Bn). This result is true for all t ∈ N and then for t = l.
Since P (Y |K) is P (X l) that is proven to be equal to P (X), we thus have
established that,
∀K ∈ [0; 1], P (Y |K) = P (X l) = P (X).
So dhCI dissimulation with CIIS strategy-adapter is stego-secure.
On the other hand, due to the definition of CIDS, we have
P (Y = (1, 1, · · · , 1)|K) = 0. So there is no uniform repartition for the stego-
contents Y |K.
To sum up, Alice and Bob can counteract Eve’s attacks in WOA setup, when
using dhCI dissimulation with CIIS strategy-adapter. To our best knowledge,
this is the second time an information hiding scheme has been proven to be
stego-secure: the former was the spread-spectrum technique in natural marking
configuration with η parameter equal to 1 [8].
3.4 A new class of ε-stego-secure schemes
Let us prove that,
Theorem 1 Let ǫ be positive, l be any size of LSCs, X ∼ U
(
B
l
)
, fl be an
image mode s.t. Γ(fl) is strongly connected and the Markov matrix associated
to fl is doubly stochastic. In the instantiated dhCI dissimulation algorithm with
any uniformly distributed (u.d.) strategy-adapter that is independent from X,
there exists some positive natural number q s.t. |p(Xq)− p(X)| < ǫ.
Proof Let deci be the bijection between Bl and J0, 2l − 1K that associates
the decimal value of any binary number in Bl. The probability p(Xt) =
(p(Xt = e0), . . . , p(X
t = e2l−1)) for ej ∈ B
l is thus equal to (p(deci(Xt) =
0, . . . , p(deci(Xt) = 2l − 1)) further denoted by πt. Let i ∈ J0, 2l − 1K, the
probability p(deci(Xt+1) = i) is
2l−1∑
j=0
l∑
k=1
p(deci(Xt) = j, St = k, i =k j, fk(j) = ik)
where i =k j is true iff the binary representations of i and j may only differ
for the k-th element, and where ik abusively denotes, in this proof, the k-th
element of the binary representation of i.
Next, due to the proposition’s hypotheses on the strategy, p(deci(Xt) =
j, St = k, i =k j, fk(j) = ik) is equal to
1
l .p(deci(X
t) = j, i =k j, fk(j) = ik).
Finally, since i =k j and fk(j) = ik are constant during the iterative process
and thus does not depend on Xt, we have
πt+1i =
2l−1∑
j=0
πtj .
1
l
l∑
k=1
p(i =k j, fk(j) = ik).
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Since 1l
l∑
k=1
p(i =k j, fk(j) = ik) is equal to Mji where M is the Markov
matrix associated to fl we thus have
πt+1i =
2l−1∑
j=0
πtj .Mji and thus π
t+1 = πtM.
First of all, since the graph Γ(f) is strongly connected, then for all vertices
i and j, a path can be found to reach j from i in at most 2l steps. There exists
thus kij ∈ J1, 2
lK s.t. M
kij
ij > 0. As all the multiples l × kij of kij are such
that M
l×kij
ij > 0, we can conclude that, if k is the least common multiple of
{kij
/
i, j ∈ J1, 2lK} thus ∀i, j ∈ J1, 2lK,Mkij > 0 and thusM is a regular stochastic
matrix.
Let us now recall the following stochastic matrix theorem:
Theorem 2 (Stochastic Matrix) If M is a regular stochastic matrix, then
M has an unique stationary probability vector π. Moreover, if π0 is any initial
probability vector and πt+1 = πt.M for t = 0, 1, . . . then the Markov chain πt
converges to π as t tends to infinity.
Thanks to this theorem,M has an unique stationary probability vector π. By
hypothesis, since M is doubly stochastic we have ( 12l , . . . ,
1
2l ) = (
1
2l , . . . ,
1
2l )M
and thus π = ( 1
2l
, . . . , 1
2l
). Due to the matrix theorem, there exists some q s.t.
|πq − π| < ǫ and the proof is established. Since p(Y |K) is p(Xq) the method is
then ǫ-stego-secure provided the strategy-adapter is uniformly distributed.
This section has focused on security with regards to probabilistic behaviors.
Next section studies it in the perspective of topological ones.
4 Chaos-security
To check whether an existing data hiding scheme is chaotic or not, we propose
firstly to write it as an iterate process xn+1 = f(xn). It is possible to prove that
this formulation can always be done, as follows. Let us consider a given data
hiding algorithm. Because it must be computed one day, it is always possible
to translate it as a Turing machine, and this last machine can be written as
xn+1 = f(xn) in the following way. Let (w, i, q) be the current configuration of
the Turing machine (Fig. 2), where w = ♯−ωw(0) . . . w(k)♯ω is the paper tape,
i is the position of the tape head, q is used for the state of the machine, and
δ is its transition function (the notations used here are well-known and widely
used). We define f by:
• f(w(0) . . . w(k), i, q) = (w(0) . . . w(i−1)aw(i+1)w(k), i+1, q′), if δ(q, w(i)) =
(q′, a,→);
• f(w(0) . . . w(k), i, q) = (w(0) . . . w(i−1)aw(i+1)w(k), i−1, q′), if δ(q, w(i)) =
(q′, a,←).
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Thus the Turing machine can be written as an iterate function xn+1 = f(xn)
on a well-defined set X , with x0 as the initial configuration of the machine. We
denote by T (S) the iterative process of a data hiding scheme S.
# w(i) #
k0
q
Figure 2: Turing Machine
Let us now define the notion of chaos-security. Let τ be a topology on X .
So the behavior of this dynamical system can be studied to know whether or
not the data hiding scheme is τ−unpredictable. This leads to the following
definition.
Definition 12 An information hiding scheme S is said to be chaos-secure on
(X , τ) if its iterative process T (S) has a chaotic behavior, as defined by Devaney,
on this topological space.
Theoretically speaking, chaos-security can always be studied, as it only re-
quires that the two following points are satisfied.
• Firstly, the data hiding scheme must be written as an iterate function
on a set X ; As illustrated by the use of the Turing machine, it is always
possible to satisfy this requirement; It is established here since we iterate
Gf as defined in Sect. (2.1);
• Secondly, a metric or a topology must be defined on X ; This is always
possible, for example, by taking for instance the most relevant one, that
is the order topology.
Guyeux has recently shown in [11] that chaotic iterations of Gf with the
vectorial negation as iterate function have a chaotic behavior. As a corollary,
we deduce that the dhCI dissimulation algorithm with negation mode and CIIS
strategy-adapter is chaos-secure.
However, all these results suffer from only relying on the vectorial negation
function. This problem has been theoretically tackled in [11] which provides the
following theorem.
Theorem 3 Functions f : Bn → Bn such that Gf is chaotic according to
Devaney, are functions such that the graph Γ(f) is strongly connected.
We deduce from this theorem that functions whose graph is strongly connected
are sufficient to provide new instances of dhCI dissimulation that are chaos-
secure.
Computing a mode f such that the image of n (i.e., fn) is a function with
a strongly connected graph of iterations Γ(fn) has been previously studied
(see [22] for instance). The next section presents a use of them in our steganog-
raphy context.
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5 Applications to frequential domains
We are then left to provide an u.d. strategy-adapter that is independent from
the cover, an image mode fl whose iteration graph Γ(fl) is strongly connected
and whose Markov matrix is doubly stochastic.
First, the CIIS(K, y, α, l) strategy adapter (see Section 2.2) has the required
properties: it does not depend on the cover and the proof that its outputs
are u.d. on J1; lK is left as an exercise for the reader. In all the experiments
parameters K and α are randomly chosen in K0, 1J and K0, 0.5J respectively.
The number of iteration is set to 4 ∗ lm, where lm is the number of LSCs that
depends on the domain.
Next, [22] has presented an iterative approach to generate image modes fl
such that Γ(fl) is strongly connected. Among these maps, it is obvious to check
which verifies or not the doubly stochastic constrain. For instance, in what
follows we consider the mode fl : B
l → Bl s.t. its ith component is defined by
fl(x)i =
{
xi if i is odd
xi ⊕ xi−1 if i is even
(1)
Thanks to [22, Theorem 2] we deduce that its iteration graph Γ(fl) is strongly
connected. Next, the Markov chain is stochastic by construction.
Let us prove that its Markov chain is doubly stochastic by induction on the
length l. For l = 1 and l = 2 the proof is obvious. Let us consider that the
result is established until l = 2k for some k ∈ N.
Let us then firstly prove the doubly stochasticity for l = 2k + 1. Fol-
lowing notations introduced in [22], let Γ(f2k+1)
0 and Γ(f2k+1)
1 denote the
subgraphs of Γ(f2k+1) induced by the subset B
2k × {0} and B2k × {1} of
B
2k+1 respectively. Γ(f2k+1)
0 and Γ(f2k+1)
1 are isomorphic to Γ(f2k). Fur-
thermore, these two graphs are linked together only with arcs of the form
(x1, . . . , x2k, 0) → (x1, . . . , x2k, 1) and (x1, . . . , x2k, 1) → (x1, . . . , x2k, 0). In
Γ(f2k+1) the number of arcs whose extremity is (x1, . . . , x2k, 0) is the same
than the number of arcs whose extremity is (x1, . . . , x2k) augmented with 1,
and similarly for (x1, . . . , x2k, 1). By induction hypothesis, the Markov chain
associated to Γ(f2k) is doubly stochastic. All the vertices (x1, . . . , x2k) have
thus the same number of ingoing arcs and the proof is established for l is 2k+1.
Let us then prove the doubly stochasticity for l = 2k + 2. The map fl
is defined by fl(x) = (x1, x2 ⊕ x1, . . . , x2k+1, x2k+2 ⊕ x2k+1). With previously
defined notations, let us focus on Γ(f2k+2)
0 and Γ(f2k+2)
1 which are isomorphic
to Γ(f2k+1). Among configurations of B
2k+2, only four suffixes of length 2 can
be obviously observed, namely, 00, 10, 11 and 01. Since f2k+2(. . . , 0, 0)2k+2 = 0,
f2k+2(. . . , 1, 0)2k+2 = 1, f2k+2(. . . , 1, 1)2k+2 = 0, and f2k+2(. . . , 0, 1)2k+2 = 1,
the number of arcs whose extremity is
• (x1, . . . , x2k, 0, 0) is the same than the one whose extremity is (x1, . . . , x2k, 0)
in Γ(f2k+1) augmented with 1 (loop over configurations (x1, . . . , x2k, 0, 0));
• (x1, . . . , x2k, 1, 0) is the same than the one whose extremity is (x1, . . . , x2k, 0)
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in Γ(f2k+1) augmented with 1 (arc from configurations (x1, . . . , x2k, 1, 1)
to configurations (x1, . . . , x2k, 1, 0));
• (x1, . . . , x2k, 0, 1) is the same than the one whose extremity is (x1, . . . , x2k, 0)
in Γ(f2k+1) augmented with 1 (loop over configurations (x1, . . . , x2k, 0, 1));
• (x1, . . . , x2k, 1, 1) is the same than the one whose extremity is (x1, . . . , x2k, 1)
in Γ(f2k+1) augmented with 1 (arc from configurations (x1, . . . , x2k, 1, 0)
to configurations (x1, . . . , x2k, 1, 1)).
Thus all the vertices (x1, . . . , x2k) have the same number of ingoing arcs and
the proof is established for l = 2k + 2.
5.1 DWT embedding
Let us now explain how the dhCI dissimulation can be applied in the discrete
wavelets domain (DWT). In this paper, the Daubechies family of wavelets is
chosen: each DWT decomposition depends on a decomposition level and a coef-
ficient matrix (Figure 3): LLmeans approximation coefficient, when HH,LH,HL
denote respectively diagonal, vertical, and horizontal detail coefficients. For ex-
ample, the DWT coefficient HH 2 is the matrix equal to the diagonal detail
coefficient of the second level of decomposition of the image.
Figure 3: Wavelets coefficients.
The choice of the detail level is motivated by finding a good compromise
between robustness and invisibility. Choosing low or high frequencies in DWT
domain leads either to a very fragile watermarking without robustness (espe-
cially when facing a JPEG2000 compression attack) or to a large degradation
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of the host content. In order to have a robust but discrete DWT embedding,
the second detail level (i.e., LH2,HL2,HH2) that corresponds to the middle
frequencies, has been retained.
Let us consider the Daubechies wavelet coefficients of a third level decompo-
sition as represented in Figure 3. We then translate these float coefficients into
their 32-bits values. Let us define the significance function u that associates to
any index k in this sequence of bits the following numbers:
• uk = −1 if k is one of the three last bits of any index of coefficients in
LH2, HL2, or in HH2;
• uk = 0 if k is an index of a coefficient in LH1, HL1, or in HH1;
• uk = 1 otherwise.
According to the definition of significance of coefficients (Def. 5), if (m,M)
is (−0.5, 0.5), LSCs are the last three bits of coefficients in HL2,HH2, and LH2.
Thus, decomposition and recomposition functions are fully defined and dhCI
dissimulation scheme can now be applied.
Figure 4 shows the result of a dhCI dissimulation embedding into DWT
domain. The original is the image 5007 of the BOSS contest [23]. Watermark
y is given in Fig. 4(b).
From a random selection of 50 images into the database from the BOSS
contest [23], we have applied the previous algorithm with mode fl defined in
Equation (1) and with the negation mode.
5.2 DCT embedding
Let us denote by x the original image of sizeH×L, and by y the hidden message,
supposed here to be a binary image of size H ′×L′. The image x is transformed
from the spatial domain to DCT domain frequency bands, in order to embed y
inside it. To do so, the host image is firstly divided into 8 × 8 image blocks as
given below:
x =
H/8⋃
k=1
L/8⋃
k′=1
x(k, k′).
Thus, for each image block, a DCT is performed and the coefficients in the
frequency bands are obtained as follows: xDCT (m;n) = DCT (x(m;n)).
To define a discrete but robust scheme, only the four following coefficients of
each 8 × 8 block in position (m,n) will be possibly modified: xDCT (m;n)(3,1),
xDCT (m;n)(2,2), or xDCT (m;n)(1,3). This choice can be reformulated as follows.
Coefficients of each DCT matrix are re-indexed by using a southwest/northeast
diagonal, such that iDCT (m,n)1 = xDCT (m;n)(1,1),
iDCT (m,n)2 = xDCT (m;n)(2,1), iDCT (m,n)3 = xDCT (m;n)(1,2), iDCT (m,n)4 =
xDCT (m;n)(3,1), ..., and iDCT (m,n)64 = xDCT (m;n)(8,8). So the signification
function can be defined in this context by:
• if k mod 64 ∈ {1, 2, 3} and k 6 H × L, then uk = 1;
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(a) Original Image.
(b)
Water-
mark
y.
(c) Watermarked Im-
age.
Figure 4: Data hiding in DWT domain
• else if k mod 64 ∈ {4, 5, 6} and k 6 H × L, then uk = −1;
• else uk = 0.
The significance of coefficients are obtained for instance with (m,M) = (−0.5, 0.5)
leading to the definitions of MSCs, LSCs, and passive coefficients. Thus, decom-
position and recomposition functions are fully defined and dhCI dissimulation
scheme can now be applied.
5.3 Image quality
This section focuses on measuring visual quality of our steganographic method.
Traditionally, this is achieved by quantifying the similarity between the modified
image and its reference image. The Mean Squared Error (MSE) and the Peak
Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) are the most widely known tools that provide such
a metric. However, both of them do not take into account Human Visual System
(HVS) properties. Recent works [24, 25, 26, 27] have tackled this problem
by creating new metrics. Among them, what follows focuses on PSNR-HVS-
M [26] and BIQI [27], considered as advanced visual quality metrics. The former
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Embedding DWT DCT
Mode fl neg. fl neg.
PSNR 42.74 42.76 52.68 52.41
PSNR-HVS-M 44.28 43.97 45.30 44.93
BIQI 35.35 32.78 41.59 47.47
Table 1: Quality measeures of our steganography approach
efficiently combines PSNR and visual between-coefficient contrast masking of
DCT basis functions based on HVS. This metric has been computed here by
using the implementation given at [28]. The latter allows to get a blind image
quality assessment measure, i.e., without any knowledge of the source distortion.
Its implementation is available at [29].
Results of the image quality metrics are summarized into the Table 1. In
wavelet domain, the PSNR values obtained here are comparable to other ap-
proaches (for instance, PSNR are 44.2 in [30] and 46.5 in [31]), but a real
improvement for the discrete cosine embeddings is obtained (PSNR is 45.17
for [32], it is always lower than 48 for [33], and always lower than 39 for [34]).
Among steganography approaches that evaluate PSNR-HVS-M, results of our
approach are convincing. Firstly, optimized method developed along [35] has a
PSNR-HVS-M equal to 44.5 whereas our approach, with a similar PSNR-HVS-
M, should be easily improved by considering optimized mode. Next, another
approach [36] have higher PSNR-HVS-M, certainly, but this work does not ad-
dress robustness evaluation whereas our approach is complete. Finally, as far
as we know, this work is the first one that evaluates the BIQI metric in the
steganography context.
With all this material, we are then left to evaluate the robustness of this
approach.
5.4 Robustness
Previous sections have formalized frequential domains embeddings and has fo-
cused on the negation mode and fl defined in Equ. (1). In the robustness given
in this continuation, dwt(neg), dwt(fl), dct(neg), dct(fl) respectively stand for
the DWT and DCT embedding with the negation mode and with this instanti-
ated mode.
For each experiment, a set of 50 images is randomly extracted from the
database taken from the BOSS contest [23]. Each cover is a 512× 512 grayscale
digital image and the watermark y is given in Fig 4(b). Testing the robustness
of the approach is achieved by successively applying on watermarked images
attacks like cropping, compression, and geometric transformations. Differences
between yˆ and ϕm(z) are computed. Behind a given threshold rate, the image
is said to be watermarked. Finally, discussion on metric quality of the approach
is given in Sect. 5.5.
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Robustness of the approach is evaluated by applying different percentage of
cropping: from 1% to 81%. Results are presented in Fig. 5. Fig. 5(a) gives the
cropped image where 36% of the image is removed. Fig. 5(b) presents effects
of such an attack. From this experiment, one can conclude that all embeddings
have similar behaviors. All the percentage differences are so far less than 50%
(which is the mean random error) and thus robustness is established.
(a) Cropped Image. (b) Cropping Effect
Figure 5: Cropping Results
5.4.1 Robustness against compression
Robustness against compression is addressed by studying both JPEG and JPEG
2000 image compressions. Results are respectively presented in Fig. 6(a) and
Fig. 6(b). Without surprise, DCT embedding which is based on DCT (as JPEG
compression algorithm is) is more adapted to JPEG compression than DWT em-
bedding. Furthermore, we have a similar behavior for the JPEG 2000 compres-
sion algorithm, which is based on wavelet encoding: DWT embedding naturally
outperforms DCT one in that case.
(a) JPEG Effect (b) JPEG 2000 Effect
Figure 6: Compression Results
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5.4.2 Robustness against Contrast and Sharpness Attack
Contrast and Sharpness adjustment belong to the the classical set of filtering
image attacks. Results of such attacks are presented in Fig. 7 where Fig. 7(a) and
Fig. 7(b) summarize effects of contrast and sharpness adjustment respectively.
(a) Contrast Effect (b) Sharpness Effect
Figure 7: Filtering Results
5.4.3 Robustness against Geometric Transformation
Among geometric transformations, we focus on rotations, i.e., when two oppo-
site rotations of angle θ are successively applied around the center of the image.
In these geometric transformations, angles range from 2 to 20 degrees. Results
are presented in Fig. 8: Fig. 8(a) gives the image of a rotation of 20 degrees
whereas Fig. 8(b) presents effects of such an attack. It is not a surprise that
results are better for DCT embeddings: this approach is based on cosine as
rotation is.
5.5 Evaluation of the Embeddings
We are then left to set a convenient threshold that is accurate to determine
whether an image is watermarked or not. Starting from a set of 100 images
selected among the Boss image Panel, we compute the following three sets: the
one with all the watermarked images W , the one with all successively water-
marked and attacked imagesWA, and the one with only the attacked images A.
Notice that the 100 attacks for each images are selected among these detailed
previously.
For each threshold t ∈ J0, 55K and a given image x ∈WA∪A, differences on
DCT are computed. The image is said to be watermarked if these differences
are less than the threshold. In the positive case and if x really belongs to WA
it is a True Positive (TP) case. In the negative case but if x belongs to WA it
is a False Negative (FN) case. In the positive case but if x belongs to A, it is
a False Positive (FP) case. Finally, in the negative case and if x belongs to A,
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(a) 20 degrees Rotation
Image
(b) Rotation Effect
Figure 8: Rotation Attack Results
it is a True Negative (TN). The True (resp. False) Positive Rate (TPR) (resp.
FPR) is thus computed by dividing the number of TP (resp. FP) by 100.
The Figure 9 is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve. For
the DWT, it shows that best results are obtained when the threshold is 45%
for the dedicated function (corresponding to the point (0.01, 0.88)) and 46%
for the negation function (corresponding to the point (0.04, 0.85)). It allows
to conclude that each time LSCs differences between a watermarked image and
another given image i′ are less than 45%, we can claim that i′ is an attacked
version of the original watermarked content. For the two DCT embeddings, best
results are obtained when the threshold is 44% (corresponding to the points
(0.05, 0.18) and (0.05, 0.28)).
Let us then give some confidence intervals for all the evaluated attacks. The
approach is resistant to:
• all the croppings where percentage is less than 85;
• compressions where quality ratio is greater than 82 with DWT embedding
and where quality ratio is greater than 67 with DCT one;
• contrast when strengthening belongs to [0.76, 1.2] (resp. [0.96, 1.05]) in
DWT (resp. in DCT) embedding;
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Figure 9: ROC Curves for DWT or DCT Embeddings
• all the rotation attacks with DCT embedding and a rotation where angle
is less than 13 degrees with DWT one.
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a new class of secure and robust information hiding
algorithms. It has been entirely formalized, thus allowing both its theoretical se-
curity analysis, and the computation of numerous variants encompassing spatial
and frequency domain embedding. After having presented the general algorithm
with detail, we have given conditions for choosing mode and strategy-adapter
making the whole class stego-secure or ǫ-stego-secure. To our knowledge, this
is the first time such a result has been established.
Applications in frequency domains (namely DWT and DCT domains) have
finally be formalized. Complete experiments have allowed us first to evaluate
how invisible is the steganographic method (thanks to the PSNR computation)
and next to verify the robustness property against attacks. Furthermore, the
use of ROC curves for DWT embedding have revealed very high rates between
True positive and False positive results.
In future work, our intention is to find the best image mode with respect to
the combination between DCT and DWT based steganography algorithm. Such
a combination topic has already been addressed (e.g., in [37]), but never with
objectives we have set.
Additionally, we will try to discover new topological properties for the dhCI
dissimulation schemes. Consequences of these chaos properties will be drawn
in the context of information hiding security. We will especially focus on the
links between topological properties and classes of attacks, such as KOA, KMA,
EOA, or CMA.
Moreover, these algorithms will be compared to other existing ones, among
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other things by testing whether these algorithms are chaotic or not. Finally
we plan to verify the robustness of our approach against statistical steganalysis
methods [38, 39, 40, 41].
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